@article { ISI:000384105900002,
	title = {Coalitional game-based behavior analysis for spectrum access in cognitive radios},
	journal = {WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS \& MOBILE COMPUTING},
	volume = {16},
	number = {14},
	year = {2016},
	month = {OCT 10},
	pages = {1910-1921},
	abstract = {The core of cognitive radio paradigm is to introduce cognitive devices able to opportunistically access the licensed radio bands. The coexistence of licensed and unlicensed users prescribes an effective spectrum hole-detection and a non-interfering sharing of those frequencies. Collaborative resource allocation and spectrum information exchange are required but often costly in terms of energy and delay. In this paper, each secondary user (SU) can achieve spectrum sensing and data transmission through a coalitional game-based mechanism. SUs are called upon to report their sensing results to the elected coalition head, which properly decides on the channel state and the transmitter in each time slot according to a proposed algorithm. The goal of this paper is to provide a more holistic view on the spectrum and enhance the cognitive system performance through SUs behavior analysis. We formulate the problem as a coalitional game in partition form with non-transferable utility, and we investigate on the impact of both coalition formation and the combining reports costs. We discuss the Nash Equilibrium solution for our coalitional game and propose a distributed strategic learning algorithm to illustrate a concrete case of coalition formation and the SUs competitive and cooperative behaviors inter-coalitions and intra-coalitions. We show through simulations that cognitive network performances, the energy consumption and transmission delay, improve evidently with the proposed scheme. Copyright (c) 2016 John Wiley \& Sons, Ltd.},
	issn = {1530-8669},
	doi = {10.1002/wcm.2658},
	author = {Belghiti, Imane Daha and Elmachkour, Mouna and Berrada, Ismail and Kobbane, Abdellatif and Ben-Othman, Jalel}
}
@conference { ISI:000371484600074,
	title = {Green opportunistic access for CRN with selfish users using Coalitional game Approach in partition form},
	booktitle = {2014 THIRD IEEE INTERNATIONAL COLLOQUIUM IN INFORMATION SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (CIST{\textquoteright}14)},
	series = {Colloquium in Information Science and Technology},
	year = {2014},
	note = {3rd IEEE International Colloquium on Information Science and Technology (CIST), Tetouan, MOROCCO, OCT 20-22, 2014},
	pages = {425-429},
	publisher = {IEEE; IEEE Comp Soc; IEEE Commun Soc; IEEE Morocco Sect; IEEE Morocco Comp \& Commun Joint Chapter; UAE IEEE Student Branch; Univ Abdelmalek Essaadi; ENSA Tetouan},
	organization = {IEEE; IEEE Comp Soc; IEEE Commun Soc; IEEE Morocco Sect; IEEE Morocco Comp \& Commun Joint Chapter; UAE IEEE Student Branch; Univ Abdelmalek Essaadi; ENSA Tetouan},
	abstract = {We study energy conservation and system performance of decentralized cognitive radio network with cognitive users. Every cognitive radio (CR) user needs to sense the channel to send data, if the channel is unoccupied by a licensed user only one winner transmits its data. Hence, all other users waste their energy in sensing the licensed bands and in negotiating the resource access without managing to transmit data packets. We formulate the sensing-energy tradeoff problem for distributed cognitive radio network as a coalition formation game. Our contribution is to apply the coalitional game design to the most important phases of cognitive radio network (CRN): sensing and data transmission. The concept of coalitional game may enforce the cooperative behavior of CR users in order to improve the system performance (energy and delay..). The network is modeled using a coalitional game in partition form with non transferable utility (NTU). After forming coalitions, no CR user in those coalitions aim to change its position. Indeed, the members of this coalition will cooperate both in sensing and access phases to improve system performance. The selfish behavior becomes evident when the cognitive users are constrained to send their data in a short delay and with a minimum of energy consumption. Our proposed algorithm explains how the selfish atittude of the cognitive user leds to join the coalition that increases its individual gain, and tacitly to improve the performance of the entire system.},
	isbn = {978-1-4799-5979-2},
	issn = {2327-185X},
	author = {Belghiti, Imane Daha and Elmachkour, Mouna and Berrada, Ismail and Kobbane, Abdellatif},
	editor = {ElMohajir, M and AlAchhab, M and Chahhou, M}
}
